Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy

Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference
Papers

Research Report No. 7/2010

Negotiating the Claim to Inclusion: Statelessness
and the Contestation of the Limits of Citizenship
Kiran Banerjee

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe
Recommended Citation
Banerjee, Kiran, "Negotiating the Claim to Inclusion: Statelessness and the Contestation of the Limits of Citizenship" (2010).
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy. Research Paper No. 7/2010.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/76

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

Research Paper No. 07/2010

NEGOTIATING THE CLAIM TO INCLUSION: STATELESSNESS AND
THE CONTESTATION OF THE LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP
Kiran Banerjee

Editors:
Peer Zumbansen (Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Director,
Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy)
John W. Cioffi (University of California at Riverside)
Lisa Philipps (Osgoode Hall Law School, Associate Dean Research)
Nassim Nasser, Ahmed Hassan (Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto,
Production Editors)

2

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 02

CLPE Research Paper 07/2010
Vol. 06 No. 2 (2010)
Kiran Banerjee

Negotiating the Claim to Inclusion: Statelessness and the Contestation of the
Limits of Citizenship

Abstract: This paper addresses how our conceptions of community and citizenship should be
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Taking my point of departure from the work of Hannah Arendt, I show how the phenomenon of
statelessness reveals tensions in our conceptions of political membership and human rights,
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diagnostic to a prescriptive focus, turning to Jurgen Habermas’ notion of discourse ethics
grounded in his account of communicative action as a means to theorize the issues raised by
statelessness and the idea of a claim to community. While discourse ethics offers a useful
framework, I argue that we need a supplementary orientation toward openness, given that
statelessness has at its core the problem of inclusion. In addressing this more fundamental
question of inclusion, I turn to contemporary theorists of agonistic democracy whose focus on
the contestability of terms and the fundamentally unsettled nature of the political provide
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Negotiating the Claim to Inclusion: Statelessness and
the Contestation of the Limits of Citizenship
Kiran Banerjee*

I. CONTESTING COMMUNITY: THE REFUGEE AS A SITE OF TENSION
Writing in the mid‐twentieth century with the horrors of the Second World War still close at
hand, Hannah Arendt noted that the emergence of stateless persons as the “most symptomatic
group in contemporary politics” served as both a catalytic factor in the emergence of
totalitarianism and as a lasting crisis of the post‐totalitarian world. Of course, since Arendt
penned her farsighted observations, the oft referred to ‘humanitarian problem’ that refugees and
stateless persons have been seen to pose has only become far more ubiquitous, with over 17
million people classified as refugees and displaced persons to date.1 Moreover, alongside the
equally pressing international issues of immigration and humanitarian intervention, the
questions posed by the phenomena of widespread statelessness has only intensified the degree
to which commitments to universal human rights and the sovereign claims of political
communities have been seen to clash, thereby complicating discussions of global justice and
the emerging international legal norms of our increasingly interconnected present. Indeed, for
our modern paradigm of human rights that has been philosophically advanced on universalistic
grounds, and yet linked to the incorporation of such rights into national institutions and law,
the refugee appears as a figure both least protected and most vulnerable under present
international arrangements.
Yet despite the apparent challenges the position of the refugee appears to offer toward our
contemporary understandings of citizenship and human rights, the issue of statelessness has
received relatively little sustained attention within discussions of international justice. In many
ways it appears as if the general consensus views statelessness as a status far too exceptional,
and therefore peripheral, to merit direct concern. It is because of this general trend that this
paper attempts in part to reorient normative political theory to the particular quandaries and
*

Doctoral candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto.

This paper was presented at the Third Annual Conference of the Toronto Group for the Study of International,
Transnational, and Comparative Law 2010 and benefited greatly from the comments of participants. Additionally, I
am grateful to Howard Adelman, Alexis Alchorn, Ishan Banerjee, Lindsay Knight, Aaron Meyer, Sean Rehaag,
Melvin Rogers, and Stephen White for valuable comments and conversations on previous drafts.
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Given that there is an obvious political dimension to the classification of individuals as refugees, it is worth noting
that the UNFPA estimates that there are over 190 million immigrants worldwide.
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issues raised by statelessness. This is because, as I hope to indicate herein, an inattentiveness
to the position of the refugee often distorts or clouds discussions of international obligations
and human rights, allowing us to gloss over the underlying inconsistencies in our prevailing
understandings of international order and global justice. A central example of this “blind spot”
in contemporary political theory is found in the later work of the seminal political theorist John
Rawls. In his The Law of Peoples, an attempt to work out a theory of justice for international
relations, Rawls entirely elides the ethical and political issues raised by immigration and
statelessness–problematically articulating a vision of interstate relations that puts the
imperatives of self‐determination and human rights in stark conflict. In this way, Rawls’
inattentiveness to the contingencies of citizenship is emblematic of the refusal to recognize the
articulation of the basis and bounds of community membership as a central political question.
Moreover, as much of the critical reception of The Law of Peoples has suggested, the problems
raised by such issues can only be neglected at the cost of considerable conceptual poverty.
With the above considerations in mind, this paper will attempt to provide a provisional
engagement with the particular issues raised by the position of the refugee and, more
generally, to suggest that the questions of statelessness should occupy a far more central place
in the considerations of normative political theory. In doing so, I will attempt to address
whether, and if so how, our conceptions of community and citizenship should be transfigured
on account of the particular theoretical and ethical concerns raised by statelessness. The first
section will offer an account of the problematic status of the refugee by engaging with the work
of Hannah Arendt to indicate how the phenomena of statelessness reveals hidden tensions in
our conceptions of political membership and universal human rights. Arendt’s incisive analysis
brings to light the precarious position of the refugee as located out of the bounds of
community, while also highlighting the particular dilemmas that any approach toward
statelessness will have to address. The second section will shift focus from a diagnostic to a
prescriptive dimension, by turning to the approach of discourse ethics offered in Jurgen
Habermas’ work as a potential means to theorize the issues raised by statelessness and the
question of the claim or right to community. As will become clear, the approach offered by
Habermas’ is suggestive of novel ways of negotiating and transforming our conceptions of
political membership toward a more just and cosmopolitan conception. However, while the
paradigm of discourse ethics provides a promising framework, I will suggest that this approach
is in need of a supplementary orientation toward openness, given that the question of
statelessness has at its very core the problematic of inclusion. In addressing this more
fundamental dimension of the question of inclusion, I shall turn to the work and insights of the
contemporary theorists of agonistic democracy William Connolly and Chantal Mouffe. As will
become clear, the focus of these theorists on the contestability of terms and the fundamentally
unsettled nature of the political provide resources for conceptualizing more open notions of
political membership. The paper will conclude by suggesting how the approaches of discourse
ethics and agnostic theory can be used to imagine formations of community that eschew the
types of exclusion central to the production of statelessness.
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II. THE PROBLEMATIC OF STATELESSNESS: SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Having established our trajectory of analysis, our engagement with the issue of statelessness
will begin by turning to the work of Hannah Arendt. Her thought offers a unique perspective on
our contemporary historical situation that importantly challenges our orientation toward the
relationship of human rights and citizenship, providing a remarkable vantage point from which to
consider such problems anew. Arguably, the figure of the refugee is central to Arendt’s concerns
regarding our forms of modern politics and community, in part driving her critical analysis in
both The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition. However, it is in the former work
that the situation of the refugee is given most explicit treatment, and it is to Arendt’s analysis of
the emergence of mass statelessness that I shall now turn to in order to briefly explicate the
problematic concerns raised by such phenomena.
As a project, The Origins of Totalitarianism represents Arendt’s attempt to understand the
historically unprecedented emergence of totalitarianism in the 20th Century through an
extensive study of the diffuse conditions under which it arose. In her study, Arendt specifically
identifies the emergence of widespread statelessness—the rendering of masses of people as
rightless and uprooted—as one among many conditions that made possible the horrors of total
domination in the modern world. Indeed, with the appearance of the refugee or stateless
person as a pervasive phenomenon, many of the previously submerged dangers and
contradictions of the nation‐state system came to the fore—perhaps most importantly in the
conceptual and practical crisis inherent in the notion of inalienable universal human rights. In
her discussion subtitled “The Decline of the Nation‐State and the End of the Rights of Man”
Arendt offers a consideration of the phenomena of widespread statelessness during the
interwar era that delineates her views of the crucial implications of such developments.
Arendt’s analysis begins by tracing the emergence of modern statelessness to the moment at
which governments of the European continent began the theretofore unheard of process of revoking
the citizenship of segments of their populations en masse. With such developments the figure of the
‘Refugee’ emerged in Europe: a stateless individual lacking any governmental protection. Arendt
notes that the sudden presence of mass statelessness quickly proved to be more than the existing
legal institutions of the nation‐state system could accommodate. Both of the traditional remedies to
the hitherto exceptional position of the exile, the right to asylum and naturalization, quickly came to
conflict with the sovereign rights of the state and, without any grounding in positive law, were quickly
disregarded.2 But what was perhaps most striking was the manner in which commitments to so‐
called ‘human rights,’ paradigmatically expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man,
rapidly began to reveal their fragile and contingent basis amid such unprecedented
developments.
In her discussion of the problematic nature of ‘human rights’ Arendt draws our attention to the
basis on which these rights were proclaimed—namely an abstract conception of man
generalized beyond his situation within a political community, a conception that depended on
2

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 280.
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the assumption that these rights derived from no other source than man’s inherent nature. Any
valid political system presupposed these rights, and thus needed to recognize them in order to
govern legitimately. But as Arendt notes, within a political system the sole guarantor of these
rights was the political sovereign itself. A tension arose, in that the very rights set forth as
natural and thus prior to the sovereign, relied upon the sovereign for their protection within
the political community.
What Arendt wished to emphasize is that the rights enshrined in such proclamations of human
rights actually refer to civic rights that can only have significance in the context of membership
in a political community. Therefore what was revealed in the phenomena of mass statelessness
was the deep interrelation and dependency between so‐called ‘human rights’ and membership
rights within a polity. Thus the fundamental loss suffered by the rightless was not a loss of a
natural, inalienable right. It was rather the loss of their right to belong to a community in which
such rights could have meaning, and of a place in the world in which their words and actions
would be taken into account. This ‘right to have rights,’ the fundamental right which the
refugee lost, was completely absent from the framework of The Rights of Man. The very
structure of such rights, in presupposing an abstract human nature as the source of their
legitimacy, could not articulate or express this fundamental right whose alienation constitutes
the denial of one’s human dignity. Yet, as Arendt observed and to some degree experienced, it
was precisely as a mere human, stripped of the markers of nationality and citizenship, that the
refugee appeared. Moreover within Arendt’s analysis the phenomenon of statelessness emerges as
a symptom of the contradiction inherent between the expansion of the system of the nation‐state
and the earlier notion of inalienable rights arising out of man’s nature. The genesis of this tension is
exemplified in the French Revolution's simultaneous and, ultimately contradictory, expression of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the demand for the national sovereignty of the people. The
people were at once supposed to have universal rights and unlimited political power—but only as
members of a nation, and therefore the sovereign political force therein. Arendt writes:
The same essential rights were at once claimed as the inalienable heritage of all human beings and as
the specific heritage of specific nations, the same nation was at once declared to be subject to the
laws, which supposedly would flow from the Rights of Man, and sovereign, that is, bound by no
universal law and acknowledging nothing superior to itself.3
In her tracing of a genealogy of the modern nation state, we see that the crisis of modern
statelessness, as precipitated by the exclusionary logic of what had been thought to be ‘human
rights,’ lies in this underlying tension between the state and the nation, as well as that between
universal rights and civil rights. Arendt’s analysis suggests that the phenomena of statelessness is not
merely coeval with the rise of the nation‐state system, but a direct extension of the logic of
sovereignty that system is predicated upon. But what perhaps was most striking about the
3

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 230.
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position of the refugee was the way in which de‐nationalization related to the conditions that
underwrite the human ability to act inhumanely to others. Within Arendt’s analysis the
situation of the refugee is tantamount to the loss of the inter‐subjective “modes in which
human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men.”4 Thus within
Arendt’s analysis the phenomena of statelessness is not only symptomatic of contemporary
exclusionary modes of community and the concomitant tensions between human rights and
state sovereignty, but actually constitutive of modalities of relatedness that allow human rights
violations to take place.
As I have tried to emphasize above, the phenomena of statelessness is fundamentally tied to
the tension we find between the universalizing impulse of human rights discourse and the
limitations imposed by our current understandings of citizenship and the state. As the
sociologist Saskia Sassen has noted of the developments of the inter‐war era, “the emergent
interstate system was the key to the creation of the stateless person, the identification of
refugees as such, and their regulation or control.”5 Indeed, perhaps what is most remarkable
about Arendt’s insights is how pertinent they remain for our contemporary situation. The
primary international response to the issues posed by statelessness has been the constitution
of intergovernmental organizations responsible for overseeing the condition of refugees—but
these institutions are themselves symptomatic of the only intensified pervasiveness of
statelessness within the world. Moreover, despite the presence of emerging norms concerning
the question of humanitarian intervention, in which sovereignty has become understood as
contingent upon the state’s responsibility to protect,6 norms regarding the position of refugees
and asylum seekers have become only more ambiguous in relation to the prerogatives of raison
d'etat. Three remarkable, though by no means isolated, recent illustrations of the unresolved
nature of these tensions clearly indicate the crucial limitations of modern human rights norms
for dealing with such issues. The first has been the 2001‐2008 Pacific Solution of the Australian
government, under which a system of offshore detention centers were established for
individuals entering the country without valid papers in order to provide greater discretion in
the evaluation of asylum seekers without violating the human rights norms that come into
effect with landed status. Such a system, which lived on in the country’s mandatory detention
policy, led to the pervasive long‐term incarceration of asylum seekers and refugees.7 The
second notable case is to be found in the intervening stages of the British Belmarsh decision of
2004 which allowed the UK government to detain indefinitely non‐citizens who would normally
face deportation, but who could not be deported without derogation from human rights

7

4

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 176.

5

Saskia Sassen, Guests and Aliens (New York: New Press, 2000), 84.

6

Thomas Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 116.

Human Rights Watch, “‘Not for Export’ Why the International Community Should Reject Australia’s Refugee
Policies,” September 2002.
Ian MacKinnon, “Australia opens controversial asylum centre on Christmas Island,” The Guardian, December 19,
2008.
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obligations because of the risk they face of being tortured in their country of origin.8 The
paradoxical outcome of this situation was the legalization of indefinite incarceration without
trial for non‐citizens under the aegis of conforming to human rights norms. More remarkable,
at just the moment when institutional innovations such as the Schengen agreement in Europe
are beginning to supposedly de‐territorialize states and breakdown borders, “detention camps
for foreigners have mushroomed across the European Union” with experiments with the
externalization of borders along the lines of the ‘Pacific Solution’ already beginning to take form
through multilateral agreements with bordering states.9 While these cases provide extreme
examples of the conflict between human rights norms and state sovereignty within the policies
of advanced industrial democracies, they are merely emblematic of general contradictory
features of our international system. Civil wars, natural disasters, widespread poverty and failed
states, amid a world of only tightening borders have only increased the number of people
caught between the interstices of our international order.
I would contend, along with Arendt, that the underlying source of our contemporary inability to
manage these pathologies of the nation state system lie in the exclusionary nature of our
current forms of citizenship and our inability to recognize the fundamental nature of the right
to belong to a community. Indeed, what is perhaps most remarkable about our current era of
globalization is that, with supposedly growing mobility and interconnectedness across the
world, the ability of human persons to move across borders would pale in comparison to that of
international trade and monetary exchange. The costs of this contradictory logic are of course
born heavily by those who find themselves on the outside of states, or as the ‘others’ of the
citizens within nations. But while Arendt’s work brings to the fore the untenable nature of our
current conceptions of community and the fundamental limitations of human rights discourse,
her insightful analysis provides us with only a problematization of the issues at hand.10

III. DISCOURSE ETHICS AND THE RIGHT TO BELONG:
Having provided a provisional sketch of the problematic conceptual challenges raised by the
phenomena of statelessness, I would now like to turn to the theoretical approach toward these
8

David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 31.

9

Caroline Brother, “Obscurity and confinement for migrants in Europe,” International Herald Tribune, December 30,
2007.

10

I have elsewhere argued that Arendt’s work implicitly contains a response to the paradox posed by statelessness
in her critique of sovereignty. But I have begun to have doubts whether such an account is a sufficient enough
basis for theorizing substantive solutions to the problems posed by statelessness. Hence this paper, which takes
Arendt’s work as a starting point for engaging with more disparate perspectives.
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issues that can be articulated through an engagement with Habermas’ work, in particular the
mode of philosophical justification he has developed under the rubric of discourse ethics. The
salience of Habermas’ thought for addressing the conceptual problems of statelessness raised
initially by Arendt is suggested by the critical edge discourse ethics potentially offers for
interrogating and dislodging the presuppositions that currently underpin our exclusionary
conceptions of ‘belonging’ necessary to the production of statelessness. Indeed, in the way they
are entwined with the ideas of community, citizenship and human rights, the issues of inclusion
raised by statelessness seem to be intimately tied to “questions having to do with the grammar
of forms of life” in our late modern era.11 Moreover the broader focus of his larger project of
the theory of communicative action, with its focus on intersubjective engagement and
attentiveness to the distorting effects of power relations, further confirm the promise of
appealing to his work within the context of our present discussion.12
In taking up Habermas’ approach of discourse ethics for the issue of statelessness, I will
interpret Habermas as a post‐metaphysical, non‐foundationalist theorist.13 Based on this
reading, I suggest the promise of his approach lies in providing a conceptualization of the issues
raised by statelessness and citizenship without having to rely upon problematic philosophical or
metaphysical assumptions that often seem to underpin our understanding of human rights.
Given the cautionary warning that Arendt’s analysis offers regarding the fragility of such
premises, a theoretical commitment to non‐foundationalism in our conceptual approach seems
most prudent and promising. Granted, this reading of Habermas as eschewing foundationalism
in his approach to communicative action is somewhat complicated by his apparent essentialism
regarding the nature of language as having as its “inherent telos” the reaching of mutual
understanding.14 However the apparent import of such accusations of a hidden
foundationalism are themselves seemingly overstated.15 Moreover, regardless of whether we
are fully sanctioned in interpreting Habermas’ theoretical commitments in this way, I believe
we can easily take up his position while still acknowledging that his account of language may
merely have the status of, to use Connolly’s phrase, “premises deeply rooted in modernity
11

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of
Functionalist Reason, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 392.

12

Such de‐centered and inter‐subjective features of Habermas’ approach are in marked contrast to the conceptual
lineage we find in the work of John Rawls, whose subject‐centered approach clearly has it’s roots in Kantian moral
philosophy. Given the marked inattentiveness of Rawls’ work on global justice to the questions raised by
statelessness, such divergences are suggestive of the potential of discourse ethics.
13

14

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2, 387‐8.

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society,
trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 287.

15

This reading of Habermas seems to be vindicated by his claim to be adopting the position of someone “operating
without metaphysical support and is also no longer confident that a rigorous transcendental‐pragmatic program,
claiming to provide ultimate grounds, can be carried out.” (Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1, 137)
See also: Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 111‐16, for a related discussion of the “hypothetical and
fallible” universalism of Habermas’ approach.
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itself.”16 Moreover, the appropriation of an approach said to be rooted in the emergence of
modernity itself seems entirely appropriate for interrogating the distinctively modern forms of
community and collective identity that are implicated in the production of statelessness.17
In turning to Habermas’ framework, we should begin by recognizing that the approach of
discourse ethics is best understood as an extension of the conception of communicative
‘rationality’ presented in The Theory of Communicative Action. The conception of
communicative rationality, according to Habermas, “carries with it connotations based
ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus bringing force of
argumentative speech.”18 Appealing to our everyday intuitions, Habermas points to the basis of
this conception of rationality in our ability to give reasons or justifications for certain modes of
action or statements about our social world, a tendency that Habermas explicitly links up with
the redeeming of normative claims.19 In reconstructing a moral theory from the suppositions of
unconstrained argumentative discourse, Habermas begins with the constrained assumption
that normative claims can be redeemed in a way analogous to truth claims.20 The weakening of
the cognitivist commitments of Habermas’ approach and the consequent limiting of the
transcendental scope of discourse ethics to “give up any claim to ‘ultimate justification’” is itself
consistent with understanding of norms that Habermas attributes to the post‐conventional era
of modernity.21 The approach of discourse ethics is therefore best understood as the working
out of implications of his conception of communicative rationality in relation to claims of
normative validity and moral legitimacy. As Thomas McCarthy notes, for Habermas the
elaboration of the principles of ethics justification “begins with a reflective turn, for these
principles are built into the very structure of practical discourse itself.”22 Therefore it is the
model of argumentative discourse that provides the principle of discourse ethics, that “only
those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in
their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.”23 The principle of discourse ethics

16

William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 241.

17

The relation between the approach of discourse ethics as an extension of communicative action to the conditions
of modernity is clear from its dependency on the world differentiation that Habermas attributes to shift to
modernity. See Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1, 52.

20

18

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1, 10.

19

Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1, 8.

Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Nicholsen.
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), 76
21

Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,77.

22

Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981), 324.

23

Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 66.
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therefore stipulates the intersubjective condition under which a norm can be justified as
expressing the common will of the plurality of those who will be effected.
Before turning toward the application of discourse ethics within our current context, it is
important to note the relation of Habermas’ approach to the tradition of Kantian moral theory,
if only to stress its crucial divergences. As a deontological approach, Kant’s monistic oriented
moral theory attempts to avoid the issue of conflicting obligations by claiming to show that the
categorical imperative itself is adequate as a moral standard for validating norms or maxims. In
this way the Habermassian approach can be seen as an extension of the Kantian tradition with
notable modifications: the rejection of the metaphysical division of the world into the nominal
and the phenomenal realm, and the insistence on a dialogical basis for moral consciousness.
For Habermas the criteria is, contra Kant, not what the individual can will without contradiction,
but what all affected parties can agree to in rationally grounded discourse. Key to Habermas’
approach is the way he construes the universalizing dimension of moral discourse in a de‐
centered fashion. Hence the criteria of impartiality for discourse ethics, taken from the
suppositions of everyday communication, is captured in the principle of universalism for the
validity of every norm, such that: “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects
its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests.”24
This is because Habermas identifies the fault in Kantian approaches to the principle of
universalization as lying in the reliance on the orientation of a subject‐centered perspective.
Such approaches fail to fully acknowledge that “valid norms must deserve recognition from all
concerned” and instead presents a conception of moral norms in which the “process of judging
is relative to the vantage point and perspective of some and not all concerned.”25 Moreover,
Habermas’ approach openly acknowledges the situated nature of the participants to discourse,
and therefore attempts to avoid the monological and transcendental dimensions of the Kantian
tradition. As Habermas writes: “Discourses take place in particular social contexts and are
subject to the limitations of time and space…their participants are not Kant’s intelligible
characters but real human beings.”26 In alternatively proposing a principle that “constrains all
affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balance of interests” one can read
Habermas as following up on the Hegelian critique of the ‘abstract universal’ of Kantian
morality that had initially suggested an attentiveness to the inter‐subjective dimension of
interaction so central to the overall project of communicative action.27 Within the domain of
our concerns over the question of inclusion, this aspect of Habermas’ theory importantly
tethers the approach of discourse ethics and grounds the criteria of the inter‐subjective
validation of norms in the situated nature of participants.

24

Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 65. Original Emphasis.

25

Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,65. Original Emphasis.

26

Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 92.

27

Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. J. Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 144‐46.
Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 65.
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In turning to the evaluation of the norms underlying the prerogatives of national territory and
state sovereignty, we should begin by briefly drawing attention to the implicit forms of ethical
justification that underwrite our contemporary understandings of citizenship and national
communities. The claims of modern states to exercise control over their borders and define the
limits of community membership extend from the logic of self‐determination—itself rooted in
the idea of democratic legitimacy and popular sovereignty.28 The basis of this understanding of
self‐determination is put succinctly by Michael Walzer in his description of the state as
“constituted by the union of people and government, and it is the state that claims against all
other states the twin rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.”29 Under this mode
of justification, the prerogatives of territorial control and the demarcation of citizenship stem
from the right of a nation or people to determine the structure and form of their mode of
collective life. In this sense, it is by appeal to the claim of self‐determination that the exclusion
of the asylum seeker and refugee are purportedly legitimated by the traditional norms of
national sovereignty. Moreover, from the standpoint of citizenship, one might infer that part of
the moral justification of the bounded nature of states would have to be tied up with the claim
of all to membership. In this sense, the claim to community, which must clearly imply the
exclusion of those outside the boundaries of such a group, is supposedly redeemed by the
expectation that those without have recourse to their own forms of self‐determining political
membership. At least as much seems to be implied in the somewhat euphemistic term of
‘displaced persons’—as if the issues posed by statelessness were merely the products of
disturbances of the interstate system, rather then symptomatic of deeper problems.30
However, in this context it is crucial to note that in understanding the claim to community as
both a normative and a moral demand, we need to recognize that the universalizing dimension
of such an appeal must be directed both to those within and those outside particular polities.
But as we have seen in our earlier interrogation of the relation of citizenship to the state, the
production of refugees seems to be inherent in the logic of our contemporary forms of community.
How are we to reconcile the status of the modern state as the underlying source of the crisis of
statelessness, and as the only means by which a ‘right to have rights’ may be secured?
Having laid out in broad outline the current structure of presumptions that underwrite our
contemporary understanding of citizenship and polity, it should be apparent that the
framework of discourse ethics forces us to re‐evaluate the legitimacy of such norms. From the
28
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impartial and inclusive perspective suggested by discourse ethics, the normative privileging of
the position of the citizen cannot simply be presumed, while the sovereign prerogatives of the
state to control entrance and limit citizenship are now in need of substantial justification. In
asking us to consider whether our current norms of citizenship and sovereignty would be
accepted by all those effected by such norms, we must clearly take into consideration the
position of those who are most disadvantaged by such institutions and who find themselves
asymmetrically located in relation to citizens—that is, at the periphery or outside the bounds of
inclusion. In this appropriation of discourse ethics, normative justification cannot be merely
circumscribed to the concerns of those within political communities, but must come to account
for those without. Moreover, while our reading of Arendt brought to the fore the factors
producing statelessness at its emergence as a mass phenomenon, at our current historical
juncture the claims to validity of such norms have only become more problematic as the idea
and integrity of the nation state has itself become conceptually dubious. The question that
discourse ethics asks us to raise is whether the norms of sovereignty and self‐determination
that allow individual states to set the criteria of entrance and control the distribution of
citizenship can be fully justified when the perspective of the refugee is taken into account. In a
sense, the issue of whether the number of claimants who fulfill the qualifications for the status
of asylum seekers or refugees are actually admitted by states that claim to adhere to human
rights is actually secondary for our current considerations. From the perspective of discourse
ethics, the real question is whether such stringent and exclusionary criteria can be justified at
all.
When taking into consideration the perspective of those caught in between communities or
who find themselves admitted under a precarious or illicit status—asylum seekers, refugees,
immigrants—we have good reason to doubt the acceptability of contemporary norms of
citizenship and territorial sovereignty. Indeed, if our foregoing analysis is correct in suggesting a
fundamental relation between our current modalities of community and citizenship with the
practices of exclusion that produce stateless, we have good reason to believe that a moral
imperative exists for weakening the boundaries of states and liberalizing the means of gaining
membership within communities. While still allowing for the values of cultural integrity and
communal life, a consideration of the question of inclusion from the position of all those
affected by the exclusionary norms of membership will clearly push us to take up a more
cosmopolitan perspective. One form this might take is in the recognition of a fundamental right
to claim citizenship within a polity—with the burden of proof against such a claim lying on the
part of the state. The development and articulation of such a right to belong would not
necessarily be incompatible with some forms of communal integrity. However such claims will
have to be justified in relation to the claims of those outside of a particular state, and not
simply decided in advance by the presumptive bias of the national interest.
As I have tried to indicate in the foregoing discussion, the approach of discourse ethics when
universally applied to the realm of those affected by our contemporary norms of citizenship
and sovereignty forces us to reconsider the contours of our current practices. However, I would
also like to suggest that the formal dimensions of discourse ethics raise certain issues for our
attempt to address the particular concerns brought to the fore by statelessness and point to
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the limitations that such an engagement will have to overcome. As Habermas himself notes of
his approach, the principle of discourse ethics is procedural rather then substantive in form,
making reference to the discursive process of the evaluation of normative claims to validity. As
he writes:
To this extent discourse ethics can properly be characterized as formal…Practical discourse is
not a procedure for generating justified norms but a procedure for testing the validity of norms
that are being proposed and hypothetically considered for adoption. That means that practical
discourses depend on content brought to them from the outside.31
Thus, much like the Kantian conception of morality based on the categorical imperative that it
aims to supercede, discourse ethics itself is not aimed at the generation of moral norms, but
rather offers a way of evaluating and potentially legitimating norms that are brought into
question. However as we have noted above, unlike the monological dimension of the Kantian
approach, Habermas explicitly constructs discourse ethics around a communicative model,
thereby explicitly emphasizing the dimension of inter‐subjective agreement between a
community of participants. Yet the very virtue of discourse ethics in attempting to base the
validation of norms in the actual participation of concrete agents in practical discourse itself
raises questions about how the realm of participants is constituted. As Habermas notes, the
very idea of practical discourse is dependent on a “horizon provided by the lifeworld of a
specific social group…” and thereby tied to particularized conceptions of community.32
Moreover, the very means in which the norm in question is itself conceptualized—a matter of
economics, of immigration, of human rights—seems to radically shift our sense of the scope of
relevant participants, and indeed points to the question of how those bounds are themselves
politically constituted. An instructive example of this is the gradual shift we have seen in the
past few decades in the refugee policies of many Western industrial democracies. Arguably,
there has been a widespread move in policy away from conceptualizing such issues as
concerning human rights, and toward treating the claims of refugees and asylum seekers
primarily as an immigration question. Such trends are exemplified more recently in the
emergence of policies designed to deflect claimants without violating international obligations,
such as the Safe Third Country Agreement between the United States and Canada.33 These
developments of course imply the normative privileging of the position of citizens by more fully
excluding potential claimants themselves from the realm of parties whose views and positions
are fully relevant to the formulation of policy. Such issues only highlight the possible difficulties
in addressing what it would mean to have stateless persons play a role in the adjudication of
the norms that would secure their inclusion in the first place. The potentiality of discourse
31
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ethics to validate new and intrinsically open forms of community is clear from our earlier
discussion, but from our contemporary standpoint we seem terribly far from having adopted
the “enlarged mentality” that the implementation of such considerations would seem to
demand. Moreover, the rootedness of our fundamental conceptions of democratic legitimacy
in the idea of bounded communities makes the leap to the standpoint of ‘citizen of the world,’
or even to a post‐national consciousness, seemingly rather distant. This suggests that
addressing the issue of statelessness in the present requires that we direct our attention
toward problematizing the very notions of citizen and ‘people’ that seemingly necessitate
political closure.

IV. THEORIZING THE CONTINGENCY AND CONTESTABILITY OF COMMUNITY:
Having drawn attention to the potential and limits of discourse ethics to point the way toward
more inclusive understandings of community and citizenship, we will now engage with the
emergent perspective of agonistic democratic theorists in order to suggest ways in which the
idea of a ‘people’ itself can be understood as intrinsically open. As indicated above, the central
dilemma facing our attempt to overcome the issues posed by statelessness is that the position
of the refugee is itself one of exclusion and in a sense constitutes a form of identity which
seemingly eludes solidarity. Therefore any attempt to overcome the particular challenges posed
by statelessness and the attempt to articulate a fundamental right to belong to community will
crucially have to underwrite the modes of inclusion necessary to bring those who fall outside of
the community within the threshold of the relevant. It is with this aim in mind that we turn to
writers such as William Connolly and Chantal Mouffe, who have helped develop and articulate
the agonistic approach toward democratic theory that places the issues of conflict and
contestation at the center of the political. Using their insights I will further develop our
engagement with the issue of statelessness along three dimensions: the unsettled nature of our
concepts of citizen and ‘people,’ the constitutive tension between liberalism and democracy,
and the potentiality for more inclusive and open notions of community that the agonistic vision
of politics suggests. These considerations will bring to light how we should understand the basis
and bounds of community as always inherently contingent, and therefore help cultivate the
orientation necessary to be attentive to the needs of those excluded.
Before beginning our engagement with the work of the aforementioned theorists’ it seems best
to briefly address and diffuse the apparent opposition that such perspectives have been
claimed to have with the approach of deliberative democracy that Habermas’ work is
associated with. Given the often emphasized challenge that the agonistic conception of
democratic politics claims to pose to the approach toward radical democracy stemming from
the critical theory of Habermas, the attempt to supplement our understanding of the issue of
statelessness by turning to both traditions is in need of some explanation. Chantal Mouffe in
particular has continually emphasized the divergences between the agonistic approach toward
the political and the understanding of politics expressed in the work of deliberative democrats
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that follow Habermas, with their emphasis on rationalism and consensus.34 However, I believe
that the claims of Mouffe and others of an extreme divergence between the two approaches
are greatly overstated—at least insofar as such claims suggest that we deny the fruitfulness of
an engagement between the perspectives. As Simone Chambers writes:
Discourse ethics does not project the ideal of a dispute‐free world, nor does it devalue
contestation. Not only is such a world unattainable, it is also undesirable. Diversity and
difference lead to criticism, and criticism leads to well founded norms.35
Positing a radical opposition between the two perspectives and their respective emphasis on
the values of political contestation/conflict and consensus obscures how they can be brought
together creatively. Moreover, Mouffe’s tendency to criticize the consensus‐oriented
dimension of discourse ethics shows a failure to appreciate the central role of the contestation
of norms to Habermas’ approach. Such an understanding of his project is echoed in Patchen
Markell’s reading of Habermas’ project as understanding “democratic politics as an unending
process of contestation” in which there is a clear recognition that “no actually existing
settlement can constitute a satisfactory embodiment of the regulative idea of agreement.”36
While this is not the place to develop a full response to Habermas’ detractors, the notions of
disagreement and dissent play important roles in Habermas’ theory which are often obscured
by readings that tend to mistakenly classify his work along with that of Rawls.37 However, such
commentators are right insofar as they contend that the agonistic approach does provide us
with a critical purchase on particular elements of political practice by distinctively emphasizing
a model of politics centered around conflict, and it is precisely this focus we should engage with
to supplement our developing approach toward statelessness.
Having indicated the general direction of my engagement with agonistic perspectives, I would
like to first turn to William Connolly’s analysis of the inherently contested nature of our central
political concepts in his book The Terms of Political Discourse. One of Connolly’s central aims in
this work is to challenge the prevalent assumption within the social sciences that the language
of politics is somehow a neutral medium that merely coveys meaning and to “focus attention
34

Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005), 12‐13.

35

Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996), 162.
36

Patchen Markell, “Contesting Consensus: Rereading Habermas on the Public Sphere,” Constellations, Vol. 3, No.
3 (1997): 379.
37

The role of conflict in his thought is perhaps most pronounced in his theorizing of the public sphere as domain of
contestation or “medium for permanent criticism”. (Theory of Communicative Action, 2, 341)
Indeed, reading the public sphere as the domain where the domination of public debate by organized political and
economic interest is challenged and contested by citizens further emphasizes this connection.

2009]

NEGOTIATING THE CLAIM TO INCLUSION

17

on the locus of space for contestation” that exists within “the fine meshes of social and political
vocabularies themselves.”38 Taking an expressivist perspective on language, Connolly draws our
attention to the fact that discussions over the “correct use of partly shared appraisal concepts
are themselves an intrinsic part of politics” and introduces the idea of ‘essentially contested
concepts’ to denote such terms.39 In this way, he carefully frames his analysis of political
discourse in opposition to what he calls ‘empiricist’ or ‘rationalist’ tendencies within political
science in order to highlight the deeply political valence of our arguments over the use of such
words as democracy, power and freedom. Connolly’s emphasis on the potentialities of
contestation and the internal discord within our political language emphasizes a certain vision
of the political as essentially open. As he writes:
Politics is, at its best, simultaneously a medium in which unsettled dimensions of a common life
find expression and a mode by which a temporary or permanent settlement is sometimes
achieved.40
Thus, perhaps most importantly for our purposes, Connolly’s work highlights the political
dimension of language itself in ways that enable us to track potential opportunities for political
innovation by allowing us to “expose conceptual closure when it has been imposed
artificially.”41 In this way, what Connolly’s analysis forces us to confront is the continually partial
and incomplete nature of our core political concepts. This suggests that the extension and
meaning of such concepts as community and citizenship can never be said to be fully decided,
while our understandings of such central ideas as ‘justice’ at any specific moment are to be
understood as always the conception of a particular group and therefore always open to
contestation and further negotiation. In this way, distancing ourselves from the approach
toward our social world that treats such questions as static and ‘operationalizable’ allows us to
see that our central concepts are not anymore settled than the actual communities within
which we live.
Connolly’s insights on the inherent contestability of our central political concepts has a central
import for our discussion of how we might overcome the forms of exclusion that produce the
situation of statelessness. In particular, the very idea of the bounds of a ‘people’ and the notion
of citizenship are revealed as themselves highly contested in the very way Connolly’s analysis
suggests. In no context attuned to the complexities of our political landscape can we truly speak
38
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of the category of citizen as having a fixed nature, or of a particular shibboleth—whether of
language, ethnicity, race, nationality, gender or class—that defines the bounds of political
membership once and for all. The disputed and variable status of the idea of the citizen is
echoed in the work of Judith Shklar, who has pointed out that “there is no notion more central
in politics than citizenship, and none more variable in history or contested in theory.”42 While
on some banal level citizenship can be understood as a particular relationship between the
individual and the state, the contours of that membership and the status it confers have varied
widely through the tradition of western thought. Such sentiments regarding the contingent and
potential variability of our social practices of inclusion and exclusion are brought to mind in
Chantal Mouffe’s statement that:
What is at a given moment considered the ‘natural order’— jointly with the ‘common sense’
which accompanies it — is the result of sedimented practices; it is never the manifestation of a
deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being.43
Placing this dimension of contestability at the center of our thinking about citizenship therefore
helps us keep in mind the inherent contingency to any idea of a ‘people’ and allows us to
cultivate a sense of solidarity with those outside our particular form of community by viewing
them always as potential citizens with legitimate claims to our concern.
Having offered an account of how the valence of contestability can begin to orient us toward
intrinsically more open conceptions of community, I would like to now attend to the elements
of the tradition of agonistic theory that emphasis the central role of conflict and antagonism to
the realm of the political more generally. Much like Connolly, the work of Mouffe also centers
around the radical potentiality of a conception of politics that emphasizes the value of
contestation for forestalling the threat of closure that seemingly haunts our democratic
practices. However, Mouffe in particular carries the thematic of contestation to the extreme in
order to argue for the irreducibility and ineliminability of the potential for antagonism within
the domain of the political. Mouffe’s antagonistic conception of politics is in part indebted to a
tempered engagement with the work of Carl Schmitt that draws off his insistence on the
fundamentally “conflictual nature of politics” and the importance of recognizing the
antagonistic and relational basis of identity, while rejecting his insistence on the “existence of a
homogenous demos.”44 According to Mouffe, this revised vision of politics centered around the
ever‐present possibility of conflict is both more in tune with the oppositional foundation of
identity and more open to the potentials for radical challenge and transformation that
democracy allows.
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Within Mouffe’s interpretation of modern democracy, our fundamental framework of political
activity is structured by the paradoxical tension between democracy as a form of rule and the
symbolic framework of legalism, rights, and equality, that characterizes liberalism.45 Drawing
off the insights of Schmitt’s critique of the liberal understanding of politics while rejecting his
dismissal of liberalism, Mouffe emphasizes how this ‘democratic paradox’ between the two
components of our modern framework of politics leads to a permanent site of tension, for “no
final resolution between these two conflicting logics is possible” with our options limited to
only precarious and temporary negotiations of this divide.46 More fundamentally, we can read
Mouffe’s identification of the conflicting logic of liberal democracy as part of the deeper
tension between legality and the sovereign will of the demos. The signature of this conflict runs
like a red thread through the history of political theory. Emblematic of this are Aristotle’s
discussions in the Politics of the tension between the will of the people and the laws of the
polity, as well as Rousseau’s opaque considerations on how to resolve that tension in a period
at which liberalism was more a nascent theory than an established tradition.47 Yet Mouffe does
helpfully flag how this tension is itself deepened by the advent of liberalism and its emphasis on
equality and rights discourse. As Mouffe notes:
By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion‐exclusion implied by the political
constitution of the ‘people’—required by the exercise of democracy—the liberal discourse of
universal human rights plays an important role in maintaining the democratic contestation
alive. On the other side, it is only thanks to the democratic logics of equivalence that frontiers
can be created and a demos established without which no real exercise of rights would be
possible.48
By dramatizing the site of liberal democracy as contingent and unstable, her analysis brings to
the fore the radically precarious and problematic dimension of any attempt to permanently
articulate more inclusive and open conceptions of community. Moreover, Mouffe’s warning
regarding the fragility of any particular political configuration is exceedingly apt in our current
age of the ‘war on terror’ when the civil rights of citizens, let alone those of resident aliens and
non‐nationals, have been notably eroded under more or less democratic institutions. As she
notes of political negotiations in general, “every order is the temporary and precarious
articulation of contingent practices”—a point that emphasizes the provisional and limited
character of any political ‘solution.’49 Such observations speak directly to the concerns at hand
by asking us to temper the cosmopolitan aspirations and pretensions of any project with the
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recognition that the negotiation of the terms of political membership is always inherently an
ongoing political project and can never be considered a fait accompli. Recognizing that the
universalizing tendencies of liberalism and human rights discourse exist in tension with the
potentialities of popular sovereignty brings to light the ever present potential to reconstitute
more open notions of community membership necessary to secure a ‘right to belong,’ while
also stressing the precariousness of such arrangements.

V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD PRACTICES OF INCLUSION
Our aforementioned reading of theorists from within the agonistic tradition of radical
democracy has attempted to illustrate how an understanding of the political centered around
conflict and contestation can be put to the uses of overcoming the conditions that produces
statelessness in our contemporary world. Such an engagement arguably provides a needed
supplement to the Habermassian approach toward statelessness by positing new modalities for
understanding citizenship as intrinsically open, and therefore provides a basis for including
those presently excluded from our forms of community in our realm of moral concern.
However, while our discussion of agonism has highlighted the essentially contestable nature of
claims to collective identity, it is crucial to emphasize that such contestability is not equally
open to all. This is a crucial insight that is emphasized in Lawrie Balfour’s recent project of
putting agonistic theory and reparations politics into conversation, because it brings to the fore
the limitations of our own attempt to engage with the tradition of agonistic theory to diagnose
the pathologies of exclusionary citizenship practices. As Balfour saliently points out:
Even if all identities are ultimately unstable or contestable, even if they are all produced
through rather than revealing foundational truths about individuals or communities, they are
neither produced in the same way or contestable to the same degree. To assume that they are
is to overlook crucial asymmetries between members of different identity groups.50
Within the context of our current discussion, such considerations draw attention to the fact
that it is just those who are most disadvantaged by our current practices of citizenship who
shall also be least able to challenge the norms that produce contemporary forms of exclusion.
While the agonistic lens provides a powerful perspective for destabilizing and challenging our
conceptions of community, we must also remain attentive to how the potentiality for
contestation is often structurally determined. Remaining cognizant of this issue emphasizes the
importance of developing forms and practices of solidarity as part of the project of re‐
conceptualizing our notions of citizenship. Such considerations suggest that the limitations of
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the agonistic perspective point to the need to foster local potentialities of community in ways
that may allow us to transcend the problematic bounds of the state and build the forms of
solidarity necessary for more inclusive orientations of citizenship. While such potentialities
remain fragmentary and uncertain at present, such experiments in developing alternative
practices of citizenship will have to play a central role in any practical attempt to grapple with
the issues raised by statelessness.

